ABSTRACT The use of fingerprint embedding at the physical layer enables a receiver to authenticate a transmitter by detecting a low-power authentication tag superimposed upon the message waveform; a theoretical framework for such fingerprinting has been outlined. We carry out single-carrier single-antenna software defined radio (SDR) experiments with a wireless communications link over which we transmit and receive packets with the embedded fingerprinting. We analyze these experimental results and find they match well with theoretical predictions. This paper demonstrates that the method of superimposed fingerprints can deliver high probability of authentication without additional bandwidth and with minimal impact on bit-error rate in SDR systems. 
I. INTRODUCTION
A cornerstone of secure communications is the ability to authenticate a message. Authentication verifies the claimed identity of a source and guards against an adversarial impersonation. Its importance is particularly prominent in wireless communications, where the shared medium provides ample access for an adversary to eavesdrop, impersonate, or jam communications.
Conventional authentication methods transmit both the data message and a separate authentication message, referred to as a tag [2] or a message authentication code [3] . The tag is a function of the data and a secret key that is shared only between the transmitter and receiver. A critical requirement is that the tag generating function be extremely difficult to invert; this ensures that an adversary cannot easily recover the key given the message and the associated tag. In the conventional approach, the authentication tag is appended to the message, and so is available to an adversary; its secrecy is predicated on the fact that it is encrypted. Appending the tag utilizes additional bandwidth.
In this work, we consider embedding the tag in the data, marking it with a unique fingerprint [1] . Unique identification relying on intrinsic features is widespread in human biometrics applications, including fingerprints, iris scans, and voice signatures [4] . Similarly, intrinsic characteristics can be used to identify a specific device [5] , such as Ethernet cards [6] or radios [7] , [8] . Fingerprints can also be embedded intentionally in a designed way, to provide unique identification and to defeat cloning and tampering. An important application of deliberate fingerprint embedding is authentication of integrated circuits [9] , [10] .
In this paper, we describe a method for physical layer authentication via fingerprint embedding, and demonstrate its application using SDRs. The design framework has been developed for single input, single output (SISO) [1] and multiple input, multiple output (MIMO) systems [11] . Our physical layer authentication approach has two primary advantages over classical approaches. One, the tag can be injected at low enough power so that an adversary can only recover a very noisy version, while still allowing authentication with high probability by the receiver. Two, the fingerprint can be designed so that it requires no additional bandwidth. The main disadvantage is that the receiver observes the message with a signal-to-noise ratio penalty because the tag acts as a source of interference for the data; however, this effect can be made negligible. Because the adversary observes the tag at a very low signal-to-noise ratio, she has very high uncertainty about the key. While the conventional authentication framework is susceptible to brute force attacks, fingerprint embedding is much less so; in the latter case, the adversary faces a fundamental information theoretic challenge, not purely a computational one.
Theoretical analysis has shown that this method can simultaneously achieve 1) low false alarm rate, and high detection probability of the authentication tag, 2) strong security against impersonation and substitution attacks, and 3) minimal increase of data bit error rate (BER) [1] , [11] . We compare our experimental results to theoretical predictions of successful probability of authentication and impact on BER as a function of the energy of the fingerprint.
We note that there exist other approaches to physical layer authentication that rely on the temporal and/or spatial uniqueness of the channel response [12] - [14] . Because these methods rely on the inherent stochastic nature of the channel, the system designer has very limited control over the fingerprint that is generated. In contrast, our approach gives the system designer a great deal of control over fingerprint characteristics. As we show, this enables systematic selection of parameters to ensure that authentication achieves target performance levels. Also, our approach is robust to temporal or spatial fluctuations in the channel that can mislead the aforementioned approaches. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the authentication system. Alice wants to send a message to Bob, such that Bob can authenticate the message as genuinely being from Alice. Alice generates an authentication tag by using the associated message 1 and a secret key that she has previously shared with Bob. In our framework, we superimpose the tag onto the modulated message so that each transmission conveys data and authentication concurrently. If Bob recovers the data message without error, he can locally regenerate the expected tag and then test for its presence in the transmission. Bob authenticates the message as being from Alice only if he detects the expected tag in the transmission. Specifically, Alice wants to send the message S to Bob and they share a secret key k. S is a complex-valued vector of data symbols drawn from a signal constellation, while k is some sequence of bits drawn from an underlying key space K. She generates the complex-valued tag vector T = g(S, k), where g(·) is a cryptographic hash function [2] . Represented in complex baseband, Alice transmits
II. AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK
where scalars p s , p t determine the relative power allocation between message and tag, respectively. We constrain the total power p 2 s + p 2 t = 1, typically with p t p s so that the tag has low power relative to the data. Using (1) the tag is superimposed directly on the communications symbols, which simplifies the synchronization and processing, so that 1 The term message refers to a sequence of data symbols, e.g., packet payload. the method is easily added into an existing system; we also note that more general schemes are possible. For the purposes of subsequent analysis, we will assume that the elements of S are independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables drawn from some digital constellation. Figure 2 illustrates an example constellation, where both the message symbols and the tag symbols are drawn from QPSK. A blue message symbol is selected, and the tag is superimposed, resulting in a nearby red symbol. Consequently, each element of transmission vector X is one of the 16 possible symbols shown in red. Assume a block-stationary flat-fading channel in additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Bob observes the block (or packet)
where w is a complex, circularly symmetric vector of white noise of length L, whose i th element has a normal distribution denoted N (0, σ 2 w ). The random channel h is a complex scalar which we model as constant for the duration of one block of symbols.
Assuming the presence of pilot symbols P and their noisy observationsP, the minimum mean squared error channel estimate is given byĥ
where (·) H denotes the Hermitian transpose. Bob performs equalization, obtainingX
where (·) * denotes complex conjugation. Bob then decodesX to obtain the message estimateŜ. Note that Bob has not done any special processing to account for the tag. 2 Also note that S is restricted to the same digital constellation as S. Bob then forms a residualR
If the tag is present, this yields a noisy estimate of T; see (1) . Finally, Bob tests for the presence of the expected taĝ T = g(Ŝ, k) inR by computing the cross-correlation between R andT, as we now explain. In the notation that follows, we use <x, y> to denote the complex inner product operation x H y, (z) to denote the real part of z, τ as the cross-correlation test statistic, L as the length of the vector S (and the tag T), p 2 m as the average symbol power in the constellation, and γ as the SNR.
From (2) we find γ to be
Also, we make use of the fact that for a zero mean complex random variable z = x + iy where x and y have the same marginal distribution (as is true for an i.i.d. source using common digital modulation schemes such as standard PSK or QAM modulations), that
Therefore,
To determine the authenticity of a received packet, Bob formulates the following hypothesis test.
H 0 : No tag or incorrect tag present.
We assume the tag and message symbols are uncorrelated. We also assume thatĥ ≈ h, i.e., the channel is estimated accurately. Then, we find
Note that the above equations are for the case of no tag present. An incorrect tag results in the same µ 0 but a smaller σ 2 0 ; thus the case of no tag leads to a more conservative test.
H 1 : Correct tag present.
2 Given p t p s by design, the receiver may ignore the presence of the tag, rather than implement a complicated joint detector.
We observe that
where the term ζ = Var(||T|| 2 ) depends on the specific constellation. For constant magnitude modulations (like QPSK), ζ = 0. For standard rectangular 16-QAM with symbols located at x + iy where x, y ∈ {−3, −1, 1, 3}, ζ ≈ 34.13. It is now easy for Bob to conduct a 1 − α confidence level hypothesis test, relying on an assumption of normality. 3 He tests if τ > τ 0 , with threshold given by
where is the cumulative distribution function for a standard Gaussian random variable. Here, α is set by the user to fix the probability of false alarm. We can also derive the power β of the test, which is the theoretical probability of (successful) authentication. This is given by
The performance of the authentication system is measured by its ability to 1) authenticate valid message-tag pairs (large value of β) and reject invalid pairs (small value of α), 2) secure against substitution and impersonation attacks, and 3) recover messages with negligible performance loss. To meet these criteria, the authentication tag is injected with low power over the duration of the message. (This is in contrast to conventional authentication where the tag is much shorter than the message but is appended and transmitted with the same power.) An appropriate choice of tag power enables the tag to be distinguished from noise and yet is weak enough to be ignored during message recovery without significant penalty. The choice of a low-power fingerprint also maintains the privacy of the secret key by allowing the adversary only a very noisy observation of the tag. Thus the adversary gains less information about the secret key and her attacks are less likely to succeed compared to the situation where the tag is observed with high SNR [15] .
We remark on the hypothesis test as formulated. Note that by assumption, the receiver has knowledge of the transmitted symbols S when testing for presence of the tag; thus, it may condition on S when formulating the distribution of τ |H 0 . Likewise, it may condition on both S and T when finding the distribution of τ |H 1 . This conditioning effectively reduces the variance in both cases, and changes the mean of τ |H 1 to a value which is now a function of the true tag T, i.e., µ 1 (T). However, we do not condition on these in our test, instead treating S and T as random variables. This leads to a more conservative test and allows us to easily generalize the expressions derived here to the caseŜ = S where the receiver observes the message with bit errors, which we examine in Section V. In practice, we find the difference in the two approaches is negligible.
A. SINR
Here we derive the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of the data symbols S, when the tag is viewed as interference. The SINR is
From (15) we see that
which shows that the SINR of a system using fingerprint embedding is finitely bounded even as the channel SNR grows without bound. There is a word of caution in interpreting (16) and figure 3. The fact that the SINR has a finite asymptotic maximum might seemingly suggest that the data symbols S will always have a fixed non-zero bit error rate, even when the channel SNR grows arbitrarily large. This is in general untrue, and the reason can be understood from Figure 2 . In the absence of noise and as long as the tag power is small enough, the presence of the tag alone can never result in a symbol error because with no noise the ''nearest neighbor'' of any tag (red) symbol is the correct data (blue) symbol. This fact will hold true in general, for small enough tag powers, as long as the tag constellation has bounded support in the complex plane. Therefore, even though the method of fingerprint embedding has a bounded SINR, it is still possible to achieve arbitrarily small bit error rates.
III. EXPERIMENTS
We conduct a series of SISO experiments with the NI-USRP SDRs [16] . We use two USRP 1 devices controlled from MATLAB that operate at center frequency 2.395 GHz [17] . The two radios are placed 20 feet apart in a laboratory environment with line of sight, and with significant reflectors and scatterers present. The transmit amplitude is varied to achieve a variety of SNR levels at the receiver. The same symbol modulation is used for both the data and the tag. We carry out two sets of experiments, using QPSK and 16-QAM modulations, respectively. We transmit 500,000 symbols per second, which translates to approximately 125 kilobytes per second (kbps) for QPSK and 250 kbps for 16-QAM. For equalization purposes, we assume a packet-wise flat-fading, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel.
A. TRANSMITTER PROCESSING
The transmitter uses the following procedure to calculate the tag associated with a message and key. Suppose the message consists of B bits; in our experiments, we use B = 800 (B = 1600) bits formed by randomly generating L = 400 QPSK (16-QAM) symbols. We segment our message into B 128 approximately equal-sized parts, denoted by S i . Each S i is then appended with the secret key and passed into an MD5 hash function, which yields a 128 bit output O i . The O i are all appended together, and the resulting sequence is truncated to length B and modulated to form the L-length symbol tag T . Note that in this manner, the transmitter uses the entire message, as well as the secret key, to form the associated authentication tag. The transmitter next superimposes the tag onto the message symbols. It then prepends the packet with a cyclic prefix, to enable channel estimation and equalization at the receiver. The transmitter next applies a root-raised cosine (RRC) filter to the complex baseband data. Finally, it up-converts to the center frequency and transmits the packet. This process is repeated for a total of about 10,000 packets per SNR level.
B. RECEIVER PROCESSING
After mixing the incoming signal to an intermediate frequency, sampling, and shifting to baseband, the receiver match filters the received data with the RRC pulse and uses the cyclic prefix for packet detection and frequency offset correction. This is followed by symbol timing detection (via the early-late-gate algorithm). The cyclic prefix is again used to do channel equalization, including amplitude and phase correction. Finally, the equalized message symbolsŜ are demodulated into a bit streamB. The same segmentation procedure as the transmitter employs is used to compute theŜ i . The receiver then uses the hash function and secret key to findÔ i , and the same truncation scheme to findT. Finally, it uses the residual received signal to test for the presence ofT.
The message data is generated pseudo-randomly, and we compute raw bit errors without any error correction coding. Figure 4 shows the probability of correct authentication for QPSK modulation of data and tag, with false alarm probability 1%, for various tag powers. The curves labelled ''theory'' are derived from equation (14) . The data and tag length is L = 400 symbols and the tag power ranges from 0.1% to 1% of the transmit power. The probability of authentication, which we refer to as p a , increases with receiver SNR. For a given SNR and tag length, p a is improved by increasing the tag to noise ratio (TNR). For example, at 10 dB, p 2 t = 0.001 has p a ≈ 0.55, while p 2 t = 0.01 has p a > 0.99. Figure 5 shows analogous results for 16-QAM modulation.
C. AUTHENTICATION PERFORMANCE

FIGURE 4.
Experimental authentication probability for various tag powers (from 0.1% to 1% of the transmit power). Packets contain 400 QPSK symbols and false alarm probability is 1%. Tag authentication performance increases with tag power. Below 6 dB, not enough error-free packets were collected to accurately compute the empirical probability of authentication.
Note that figures 4 and 5 only show results beyond some minimum SNR. This is because the probability of authentication is conditional on no bit errors; for low SNR, the number of error-free packets is too low to reliably compute the empirical probability of authentication. In both figures, the upper bound generally becomes tighter with growing SNR. At lower SNR, unmodeled errors (such as in equalization performance) may contribute to the relatively small mismatch between theory and experiment.
Note from (11) that the cross-correlation statistic τ depends on the tag energy, so that one can increase p a for a given tag power by increasing the tag length L. Figure 6 compares p a for various tag lengths. Observe that at approximately 10 dB, the probability of authentication is > .95 for L = 800, whereas for L = 400 we attain p a = .95 at 15 dB. For a fixed tag power and tag length, one could also increase tag energy by spreading the tag over consecutive messages. In this manner, an arbitrarily high level of authentication probability can be attained even at extremely low tag powers. Experimental authentication probability for various tag powers (from 0.1% to 1% of the transmit power). Packets contain 400 16-QAM symbols and false alarm probability is 1%. Tag authentication performance increases with tag power. Below 13 dB, not enough error-free packets were collected to accurately compute the empirical probability of authentication. FIGURE 6. Experimental authentication probability for tag power equal to 0.1% of transmit power, for tag lengths of 400, 800, or 1200 symbols. False alarm probability is 1%. Tag authentication performance increases with tag length. Below 6 dB, not enough error-free packets were collected to accurately compute the empirical probability of authentication.
IV. KEY SECURITY
Protection of the secret key is critical for resistance to attacks where an adversary attempts to tamper with the message without detection, e.g., substitution and impersonation attacks [15] . A natural security metric is equivocation (or conditional entropy [18] ) of the secret key. High key equivocation, where adversaries have high uncertainty about the secret key, is desirable for system security.
Let us assume that Eve knows everything about the system except for the secret key. In particular, she knows the hash function g, the modulation schemes used by Alice and Bob, the tag space T and the key space K. We also assume she achieves perfect recovery of S. Let us also suppose that for every (S, T) = (S, g(S, k) ) pair, there is one and only one key k that maps to that pair. This is the best case for Eve because it means g is invertible in the key, and that a brute force attack based on a single noiseless observation of (S, T) is guaranteed to find it. We assume that the tag space is larger than the key space, i.e., |K| < |T |. For example, an N -bit tag has
Under these conditions, the key equivocation can be approximated by [11, eq. 45 ]
where p e is the tag BER and entropy H (x) −x log x. Experiments were carried out with QPSK, as described previously. The tag BER is calculated with the QPSK-demodulated residual signal and is a function of TNR. Figure 7 shows the experimentally derived key equivocation in equation (17) for various tag powers. The key equivocation is calculated based on the observed tag bit error rate for each SNR. This figure shows the case where K = 256 bits and T = 800 bits (recall that the tag consists of 400 QPSK symbols). Higher receiver SNR decreases key equivocation. Intuitively, if Eve has a cleaner observation of the residual, she has less uncertainty of the tag and hence the key. For the scenarios of interest, i.e., low tag power, the key equivocation is near its 256-bit maximum.
Lowering the tag power increases key equivocation. As with the effect of receiver SNR, reducing the TNR reduces the ability of the receiver to make an accurate estimate of the tag. A large increase in key equivocation is apparent when reducing the tag power from 1% to 0.1%. It should be noted, however, that the intended receiver and the eavesdropper have very different goals. The intended receiver has the detection problem to determine the presence of the correct tag, comparing with the (noise free) expected tag. The eavesdropper has the much harder goal of estimating the secret key given (presumably perfect) message data and noisy (low TNR) observations of the authentication tag. As shown in Figure 4 , reducing the tag power does impact the ability of the intended receiver to authenticate properly. So, a design balance is sought to achieve the desired authentication performance while maintaining a high level of security.
A. MESSAGE RECOVERY
Recall that the receiver ignores the presence of the tag, which acts as small additional noise with respect to data demodulation. Figures 8 and 9 show the data BER as a function of SNR, with the tag transmitted at various power levels. The authentication slightly reduces the data SNR with a resulting minimal increase in BER. These figures show that the effective received SNR penalty is less than 1 dB for the tag power allocations tested. The theoretical BER curve in AWGN, labelled ''0 Theory'', is overlaid for comparison in both figures. Because the impact on data BER is shown to be slight for tag powers as high as 1%, this gives ample room for the designer to choose the appropriate operating point that balances authentication probability and key equivocation. For example, Figures 4, 7 , and 8 taken together show that in designing a system for 10 −3 uncoded data BER at 10 dB, we can achieve > 99% authentication probability and 251 bits of key equivocation using tags consisting of 400 QPSK symbols at 0.5% signal power. Alternatively, if the tag is lengthened as in Figure 6 , the power of the tag p 2 t can be reduced while maintaining or increasing the authentication probability p a . The lower-powered tag then yields higher key equivocation and has lower impact on the message BER. . Authentication has minimal impact on the data bit error rate. Tag powers range from 0.1% to 1% of the transmit power. At higher SNR, statistical variation in the empirical BER curves increases due to the high variance of estimating a rare event.
V. AUTHENTICATION PERFORMANCE WITH IMPERFECT MESSAGE RECOVERY
In (14) we have derived the theoretical probability of authentication, β, conditioned on the assumption of perfect message recovery, which enables computation of the fraction of correctly recovered packets that we can successfully authenticate. In this section, we compute the fraction of all received packets that we can successfully authenticate, which we refer to as the unconditional probability of authentication.
Clearly, if the message is not properly recovered, then the tag will be computed incorrectly and hence authentication will fail with high probability. Let P(A) be the unconditional probability of authentication. Then, for a fixed SNR, we have
where P(C) is the probability of correct message recovery, β is the conditional probability of authentication given the correct message, and α is the probability of authentication false alarm as defined in Section II. For example, under a binary symmetric channel (BSC), P(C) = (1 − ρ) L , where ρ is the bit error rate and L is the packet length. Our design philosophy is to set α ≈ 0. Thus the key difference in (14) compared to (18) is that in the former, P(C) implicitly equals 1. Figures 10 and 11 show theory and experimental results, plotting P(A) from (18) . The theoretical curves assume a binary symmetric channel. Figure 10 depicts the QPSK case, and Figure 11 shows the 16-QAM case, with experimental parameters as considered previously. Here, the probability of authentication is not conditioned on error free messages. Equation (18) combines all system parameters (SNR, BER, message length, tag energy, tag false alarm rate).
For example, Figure 10 shows that with a tag power of p 2 t = 0.01 at 10 dB SNR, authentication occurs with probability 0.9. We contrast this with Figure 4 , showing the FIGURE 10. Experimental unconditional authentication probability for various tag powers (from 0.1% to 1% of the transmit power). Packets contain 400 QPSK symbols and false alarm probability is 1%. FIGURE 11. Experimental unconditional authentication probability for various tag powers (from 0.1% to 1% of the transmit power). Packets contain 400 QPSK symbols and false alarm probability is 1%.
probability of authentication conditioned on correctly demodulating the message, which is ≈ 1. Thus, Figure 10 predicts overall system authentication performance; we note that with proper system design the authentication error is almost completely dominated by the probability of message error.
Similar conclusions hold for Figure 11 in the 16-QAM case. Note in this case that, for the system parameters in this experiment, increasing the tag power from .001 to .01 has no impact on the authentication performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
A wireless physical layer authentication design has been validated in over-the-air single-antenna SDR experiments. Our scheme protects the secret key from untrustworthy third parties because the method is statistically powerful enough VOLUME 3, 2015 to enable the intended receiver to reliably authenticate a very low power authentication fingerprint, with negligible impact on the data BER. We have shown that the method is realizable on SDRs, and the experimental results match theoretical predictions well. We note that our method is robust to suboptimal hardware properties; for example, the SDRs used in our experiments have a rapidly time-varying frequency offset on the order of 100 kHz. We have also shown the method performs well in complex multipath fading channels such as an indoor office environment with many scatterers.
